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Abstract 
This paper evaluates the impact of firm and drug attributes on the stock price movements of drug 
companies before, during, and after a drug approval decision by the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA). Previous literature demonstrates significant stock price volatility around these events on 
average, but do not explicitly examine if certain attributes can help explain this volatility for 
individual companies. In this paper, holding period returns and cumulative abnormal returns 
(obtained via the Fama-French model) are regressed on relevant firm and drug attributes. The 
findings suggest that the type of disease a drug treats has little impact on its stock price return, 
while more novel drug application types have a positive effect on returns. Other variables have 
effects that vary depending on the time-period analyzed. Based on these findings, to maximize 
expected short-term returns, investors should only buy and hold a drug company stock before the 
FDA decision is announced. Investors should prioritize investing in companies that have not 
generated revenue and whose drug applications are Type 1 and have orphan designation. 
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1.0 Motivation 
The development of a new drug in the United States is a regulated, expensive, and time-consuming 
process. The average drug costs over $1 billion in research and development across 12 years, 
including three phases of clinical trials (De Schrijver, 2013). This development process is regulated 
by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and it makes the decision of whether a new drug is 
approved. Once a drug passes Phase 3 clinical trials, a company will submit a new drug application 
(NDA) to the FDA for review (FDA, 2017). The FDA will then announce a target date at which it 
will announce a decision, usually 10 months after the date of acceptance (FDA, 2017). This binary 
event of FDA approval or rejection can have significant implications on the future of these drug 
companies. An approval can lead to millions of dollars in new drug sales, while a rejection results 
in costly delays or the outright abandonment of millions of dollars in research and development.  
Given the volatility of these FDA decisions, previous research has looked at the stock price 
movements of these drug companies throughout this process. There are three specific periods of 
interest: 1) the pre-announcement period leading up to the day before the decision, 2) the 
announcement period the day of and the day following the decision, and 3) the post-announcement 
period in the days after the first day following the decision.  
Broadly, both companies whose drugs are ultimately approved or rejected experience stock price 
increases leading up to the decision date. Rothenstein et al. (2011) find pre-announcement returns 
of 18% for firms of oncology drugs that are up for FDA approval, while De Schrijver (2013) finds 
pre-announcement returns of 24% for NASDAQ-listed firms. Not only are these returns 
economically large, but they do not differ statistically between eventual approvals and rejections, 
opening the investment idea of buying a firm with a drug up for approval and selling before the 
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actual decision is made. However, there is a significant divergence in the return of approvals and 
rejections the day the decision is made. Rothenstein et al. find the holding period return (HPR) 
increases from 18% to 25% for approvals, but drops to -29% for rejections, while De Schrijver 
finds the HPR increase from 24% to 40% for approvals, but drops to -4% for rejections. This 
asymmetry between the increase in returns for approvals and the decrease in returns for rejections 
may support the idea of selling the stock before the actual decision is made. 
While there is evidence of stock price volatility around FDA approval decisions on average, it is 
important to consider if certain attributes lead to higher returns. For example, do firms with drugs 
treating a specific disease area, such as cancer, have consistently different returns than firms with 
drugs treating a different area? If so, investors would be able to screen for these characteristics 
when investing in a firm with a drug up for approval, thus generating better certainty of their 
returns. This is particularly relevant in the biotechnology sector, as it is among the most volatile 
equity sectors. If drug and firm-specific factors influence returns around FDA approval decisions, 
investors are able to reduce their exposure to idiosyncratic risk and better optimize their portfolios. 
In the absence of any relationships between characteristics and the stock prices returns of each 
company, this may imply that investors treat different companies with a drug up for approval as 
the same. Interestingly, little research exists that tries to explain these FDA-related stock returns 
as functions of the drug or firm’s characteristics.  
This paper adds to the literature by evaluating the impact of drug and firm-specific characteristics 
on the respective company’s stock price movement before, during, and after an FDA approval 
decision. The key research question asks: “Do drug and firm-specific characteristics help explain 
the stock price movements of a firm with a drug up for FDA approval? If so, what is its impact on 
the company’s stock price return?” The hypothesis is that attributes that lead to a higher likelihood 
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of approval or greater profit potential will lead to higher returns around FDA approval decisions. 
This hypothesis is tested by first reviewing past literature of FDA-related stock price movements 
to identify stock return methodologies and possible attributes that likely influence returns. 
Secondly, a sample is generated of NASDAQ-listed companies that had a drug approved from 
January 2013 to December 2017. Thirdly, stock price returns are regressed on company and drug 
attributes in each time-period. From these findings, general investor strategies are discussed.  
2.0 Relevance to Past Studies in the Literature 
2.1 Stock Price Movement Around FDA Approval Decisions 
Papers generally look at the stock price returns of companies around FDA approval decisions in 
two ways: holding period returns (HPRs) and cumulative abnormal returns (CARs). HPRs are the 
observed stock price returns of a company over a given time-period. For example, De Schrijver 
(2013) finds pre-announcement HPRs of 24% for NASDAQ-listed firms from t = [-60,-1], where 
t = 0 is the day of the decision announcement. In other words, buying a NASDAQ-listed stock 
with a drug up for FDA approval 61 days before the decision and selling one day before the 
decision yielded an average return of 24% in their sample.  
However, HPRs do not control for stock price movements that are not directly associated with the 
stock, such as the return of a market index like the S&P500 or NASDAQ Biotechnology Index 
(^NBI). As such, researchers also look at abnormal returns to try and isolate the stock price effect 
of the FDA decision. This is an application of event study analysis.  
The abnormal return for firm i on event day t, ARit, is calculated as: 
 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑁𝑅𝑖𝑡 (1) 
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Where R is the observed daily return and NR is the predicted daily normal return. Most researchers 
estimate normal returns using the Fama-French model (Fama and French, 1993). The Fama-French 
model states that the return of an individual asset (Ri) depends on the risk-free rate (Rf), the excess 
return of a global market index over the risk-free rate (Rm – Rf), the excess returns of small market 
capitalization companies over large capitalization companies (SMB), the excess returns of 
companies with a high book-to-market over low book-to-market companies (HML), and the 
company’s exposure to the latter three factors (βm, βs, βh, respectively): 
 𝑅𝑖 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝑅𝑓 + 𝛽𝑚 ∗ (𝑅𝑚 − 𝑅𝑓) + 𝛽𝑠 ∗ 𝑆𝑀𝐵 + 𝛽ℎ ∗ 𝐻𝑀𝐿 (2) 
To generate a firm’s Fama-French model, a training period is selected that should reflect normal 
behavior of the stock price. Following this, daily observed returns during the training period are 
regressed on the daily Fama French factors to yield coefficient estimates. This yields the following 
equation for the normal returns of stock i at time t:  
 𝑁𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼?̂? + 𝑅𝑓𝑡 + 𝛽𝑚𝑖̂ ∗ (𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡) + 𝛽𝑠?̂? ∗ 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽ℎ?̂? ∗ 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 (3) 
Thus, abnormal returns are calculated:  
 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝛼?̂? − 𝑅𝑓𝑡 − 𝛽𝑚𝑖̂ ∗ (𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓𝑡) − 𝛽𝑠?̂? ∗ 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 − 𝛽ℎ?̂? ∗ 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 (4) 
Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) can now be calculated for a stock i for the period [T1, T2]: 
 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑇2
𝑡=𝑇1
 (5) 
A summary of average HPRs and CARs from previous literature can be found in Table 1:  
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Table 1: Summary of HPRs and CARs from previous literature  
 
Several key themes emerge. Firstly, there are high HPRs leading up to the FDA decision, 
regardless if the eventual outcome is positive. Contrarily, CARs are evaluated over a smaller 
period and are much lower than HPRs. My paper will evaluate CARs over a longer period that is 
equal to the period for HPRs to see if high abnormal returns exist and can be attributed to specific 
characteristics. The lack of divergence in returns leading up to the decision date between eventual 
approvals and rejections indicates that the risk of differential information transmission (i.e. insider 
trading) is low.1 Furthermore, De Schrijver and Sarkar and de Jong’s normal returns model may 
                                                          
1 The low risk of insider trading around FDA approval decisions is a result of the information being held by a small 
group of people belonging to a neutral third-party regulatory agent (i.e. the FDA). This contrasts with the 
announcement of clinical trial results, which are much more prone to insider trading as there are more people involved 
and the day on which the non-public information becomes public is much more uncertain (De Schrijver, 2013). In 
fact, in Phase 3 clinical trials, Rothenstein et al. (2011) find companies with positive results experience a stock price 
increase of 9.4% in the 60 days before the release of results, while unsuccessful companies experience a decrease of 
-4.5%. Rothenstein et al. (2011) conclude that insider trading is the most likely explanation for the observed stock 
price anticipation prior to the announcement. 
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not reflect a stock’s regular price movement. De Schrijver uses a training period of [-140,-90] 
while Sarkar and de Jong use a training window of [-121,-11]. It is possible that these windows 
are too close to the decision date and do not capture usual stock price movement. I will use a longer 
training window of [-250,-65] to ensure a better representation of normal stock price behavior.  
During the announcement period, there is a significant divergence in both HPR and CAR between 
approvals and rejections. Furthermore, the magnitude for rejections is much larger than approvals. 
I will analyze the expected return of stock prices during this period when discussing investor 
strategies to determine if it is worth holding a stock beyond the actual announcement. During the 
post-announcement period, CARs for both approvals and rejections are largely negative, implying 
that it is not worth buying the stock after the decision has been made. I will confirm this in the 
post-announcement returns in my sample.  
An additional theme is that NASDAQ stocks have much greater price movement than NYSE 
stocks. NASDAQ companies are typically much smaller than NYSE companies and have a smaller 
drug pipeline (De Schrijver, 2013). Therefore, the incremental impact of a drug approval is more 
significant and the associated stock price movements are more volatile. This paper will focus 
exclusively on NASDAQ companies, as they may provide more lucrative returns for investors. 
2.2 Drug and Firm Covariates on Stock Price Movement Around FDA Approval Decisions 
Lacey and Sharma (2004) evaluate the effect of the type of new drug application on different CAR 
periods from [-10,10]. They find that Type 1 applications, i.e. drugs that consist of a new molecular 
entity (NME), have the highest returns among application types. This aligns with the expected 
higher profitability potential of these drugs as they are addressing untapped markets. As such, I 
will also include application types as independent variables.  
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Sarkar and de Jong (2006) regress abnormal returns of the day following FDA approval (i.e. ARit 
from [0,1]) on several covariates. Firm-specific covariates include market capitalization, a dummy 
if this is the firm’s first ever approval, and a dummy if the firm competes on the drug benefit level 
with another firm. Drug-specific covariates include a dummy for leading therapeutic classes, a 
dummy for priority-status drugs, a dummy for orphan drugs, a dummy for prescription drugs, a 
dummy if the drug will be brought to market in partnership with another firm, and a dummy if the 
drug is the first on the market for a particular ailment. 
Sarkar and de Jong find that, despite an average abnormal return of 0.44% following FDA 
approval, their model is only able to explain 14.5% of this variation. Coefficients on Market 
Capitalization and First Mover are both significant at the 10% level and are negative, implying 
lower returns for larger companies and companies that are the first to treat an ailment. The 
coefficient on Novice Firm is statistically significant at the 1% level and is positive, implying 
larger returns for companies that are bringing their first drug to market.  
My paper will build on Lacey/Sharma and Sarkar/de Jong’s findings in several ways:  
Firstly, my paper will focus on a more recent time-period: from January 1, 2013 to December 31, 
2017. Lacey/Sharma and Sarkar/de Jong’s sample data is from approximately 20 to 30 years ago 
and the pharmaceutical and biotech investor landscape has changed dramatically, especially with 
the rise in technology and information accessibility.   
Secondly, my paper will regress attributes on returns from an extended period. Sarkar/de Jong only 
look at a one-day period on the day of the announcement (i.e. [0,1]), while Lacey/Sharma look at 
a short period from [-10,10]. However, it may be the case that firm and drug-specific characteristics 
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have more of an impact over an extended period leading up to and following approval. Thus, my 
paper will look at returns over three distinct windows: [-60,-1], [0,1], and [2,20]. 
Thirdly, my paper will also regress attributes on HPRs, in addition to CARs. Actual returns may 
be important to use in regression analysis, as the estimated normal return model may not strongly 
apply to volatile firms with a drug up for approval, thus providing poor estimates of normal returns. 
Lacey/Sharma and Sarkar/de Jong use the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) to estimate normal 
returns. However, the Fama-French Three Factor model explains more systematic stock price 
variation than the CAPM, providing more accurate abnormal return estimates (Fama and French, 
1993). Thus, I will use the Fama-French model when calculating normal returns.   
Fourthly, my paper will include different independent variables that theoretically may affect the 
stock price returns of companies with a drug up for approval. Certain characteristics have been 
shown to increase a drug’s probability of approval, which should in turn affect its stock price 
returns. The Biotechnology Innovation Organization (BIO) published findings from 7,455 drug 
development programs from 2006 to 2015 (BIO, 2015). Firstly, the disease area a new drug is 
targeting has an impact on its likelihood of approval, with cancer drugs having a 79% likelihood 
of approval on its first review, while psychiatry drugs have only a 37% likelihood. Thus, my paper 
will include dummy variables for major disease areas to see if these differences in approval 
likelihood is reflected in stock price movements. Secondly, the classification of a drug application 
impacts its probability of approval. Drugs that have a new molecular entity (NME) have the lowest 
probability of approval at 78%, while non-NMEs have the highest probability at 90%. In addition 
to its relationship with approval probability, Type of Application is important to include as it 
affects potential profitability upside. For example, a NME drug (Type 1 application) that is the 
first to treat a disease likely has a higher profitability potential than a drug application that is only 
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a slight change on an existing treatment (Type 4). Thus, I will include dummy variables for the 
Type of Application, which aligns with the findings of Lacey/Sharma and is more encompassing 
than Sarkar/de Jong’s “First mover” variable. Thirdly, drugs that treat a rare disease, referred to as 
Orphan drugs, have an ultimate approval likelihood of 89% versus 85% for other drugs. Thus, I 
will also include a dummy variable for Orphan drugs. Fourthly, if a drug is rejected by the FDA, 
it has a higher probability of approval on its next review. For example, drugs have a 61% 
probability of being approved on its first review and an 80% probability of being approved on its 
second review. Thus, my paper will include a variable to represent previous rejections of that drug. 
Other included variables are discussed in Appendix 1. 
3.0 Empirical Model and Estimation 
To evaluate the impact of firm and drug-specific characteristics on stock price movements before, 
during, and after FDA decisions, separate models are constructed for HPRs and CARs. Each model 
is estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression.  
3.1 Estimating the Impact on Holding Period Returns 
Daily actual returns are calculated for each firm from [-250,20]. Holding period returns (HPRiv) 
are created for each of the three time-periods of interest. A HPR is the return an investor would 
receive if they bought the stock at the closing price the day before the first day of the interval and 
sold at the closing price on the last day of the interval. Thus, the HPR for firm i each period is: 
Pre-Announcement Window [-60,-1]: 𝐻𝑃𝑅𝑖,−60,−1 =
𝑃𝑖,−1 − 𝑃𝑖,−61
𝑃𝑖,−61
 (6) 
Announcement Window [0,1]: 𝐻𝑃𝑅𝑖,0,1 =
𝑃𝑖,1 − 𝑃𝑖,−1
𝑃𝑖,−1
 (7) 
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Post-Announcement Window [2,20]:  𝐻𝑃𝑅𝑖,2,20 =
𝑃𝑖,20 − 𝑃𝑖,1
𝑃𝑖,1
 (8) 
As there may be significant price movement on any given day, instead of using a single closing 
price for each price, average prices three-days before or after are used in the Pre-Announcement 
and Post-Announcement windows. This follows a similar method as Rothenstein et al. (2011). 
Thus, the refined HPR for firm i for each period is: 
Pre-Announcement Window [-60,-1]:   
 𝐻𝑃𝑅𝑖,−60,−1 =
(𝑃𝑖,−1 + 𝑃𝑖,−2 + 𝑃𝑖,−3)
3
⁄ −
(𝑃𝑖,−61 + 𝑃𝑖,−62 + 𝑃𝑖,−63)
3
⁄
(𝑃𝑖,−61 + 𝑃𝑖,−62 + 𝑃𝑖,−63)
3
⁄
 (9) 
Announcement Window [0,1]:    
 𝐻𝑃𝑅𝑖,0,1 =
𝑃𝑖,1 − 𝑃𝑖,−1
𝑃𝑖,−1
 (10) 
Post-Announcement Window [2,20]:    
 𝐻𝑃𝑅𝑖,2,20 =
(𝑃𝑖,20 + 𝑃𝑖,21 + 𝑃𝑖,22)
3
⁄ −
(𝑃𝑖,1 + 𝑃𝑖,2 + 𝑃𝑖,3)
3
⁄
(𝑃𝑖,1 + 𝑃𝑖,2 + 𝑃𝑖,3)
3
⁄
 (11) 
A separate regression of HPRs on the independent variables of interest is conducted for each time-
period. A full description of dependent and independent variables can be found in Appendix 1. 
Thus, the following relationship can be estimated for firm i at interval v: 
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𝐻𝑃𝑅𝑖𝑣 = 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑏𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑖
+ 𝛽3 ∗ 𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑠𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑟_ℎ𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽4 ∗ 𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑖
+ 𝛽5 ∗ 𝑛𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽6 ∗ 𝑜𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽7 ∗ 𝑝𝑠𝑦𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖
+ 𝛽8 ∗ 𝑣𝑖𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖 + 𝛽9 ∗ 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒1𝑖 + 𝛽10 ∗ 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒2𝑖 + 𝛽11 ∗ 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒4𝑖
+ 𝛽12 ∗ 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒5𝑖 + 𝛽13 ∗ 𝐵𝐿𝐴𝑖 + 𝛽14 ∗ 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠_𝑟𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖
+ 𝛽15 ∗ 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖 + 𝛽16 ∗ 𝑜𝑟𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽17 ∗ 𝑙𝑜𝑔_𝑚𝑘𝑡𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖
+ 𝛽18 ∗ 𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒_𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽19 ∗ 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠_𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑_𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖,𝑣−1
+ 𝛽20 ∗ 𝑁𝐵𝐼𝑖𝑣 + 𝛽21 ∗ 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖 + 𝜀𝑣 
(12) 
3.2 Estimating the Impact on Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
A similar process occurs when looking at CARs, however an intermediary step is to calculate 
abnormal returns. The Fama-French Three Factor model is constructed for each firm using a 
training window of [-250,-65] to capture normal stock price behavior. The risk-free rate can be 
dropped as it is effectively 0% on a daily basis over the period of January 2013 to December 2017. 
Thus, daily abnormal returns from [-60,20] are calculated as follows: 
 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝛼?̂? − 𝛽𝑚𝑖̂ ∗ 𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝛽𝑠?̂? ∗ 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 − 𝛽ℎ?̂? ∗ 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 (13) 
Cumulative abnormal returns (CARit) are created for each of the three time-periods of interest: 
Pre-Announcement Window [-60,-1]: 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,−60,−1 = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
−1
𝑡=−60     (14) 
Announcement Window [0,1]: 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,0,1 = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
1
𝑡=0     (15) 
Post-Announcement Window [2,20]:  𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,2,20 = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
20
𝑡=2     (16) 
The regression equation is similar to the equation for holding period returns, except that 
previous_period_return and NBI are excluded as they are already considered when developing an 
estimate for normal returns. Thus, the estimated equation is as follows: 
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𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑣 = 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑏𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑖
+ 𝛽3 ∗ 𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑠𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑟_ℎ𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽4 ∗ 𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑖
+ 𝛽5 ∗ 𝑛𝑒𝑢𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽6 ∗ 𝑜𝑝𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽7 ∗ 𝑝𝑠𝑦𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖
+ 𝛽8 ∗ 𝑣𝑖𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖 + 𝛽9 ∗ 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒1𝑖 + 𝛽10 ∗ 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒2𝑖 + 𝛽11 ∗ 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒4𝑖
+ 𝛽12 ∗ 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒5𝑖 + 𝛽13 ∗ 𝐵𝐿𝐴𝑖 + 𝛽14 ∗ 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠_𝑟𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖
+ 𝛽15 ∗ 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖 + 𝛽16 ∗ 𝑜𝑟𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑖
+ 𝛽17 ∗ 𝑙𝑜𝑔_𝑚𝑘𝑡𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖 + 𝛽18 ∗ 𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒_𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽19 ∗ 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖
+ 𝜀𝑣 
(17) 
Robust standard errors are used for both models, as the distribution of the error term may be 
different for each firm. Standard errors are also clustered by firm, as many firms develop multiple 
drugs in the sample and should have a similar error term distribution.  
4.0 Description of Data 
4.1 Sample Selection 
My sample consists of 100 firms that had a drug approved between January 1,  2013 and December 
31, 2017. Drug approvals were gathered from the FDA’s monthly approval database. Each 
company was researched to determine if it was trading on the NASDAQ at the time of approval, 
and companies that were not were excluded. Some drugs are filed under multiple applications, thus 
these duplicate observations are removed. Drug companies that were acquired or involved with a 
merger during the period [-250,20] were also removed to avoid confounding effects on the stock 
price. Drug companies that have multiple drugs approved within the same window [-60,20] were 
also removed. Finally, companies that were addressed to on the letter of approval (LOA) that have 
a partnership with the firm listed on the FDA approval database were included. The following is a 
summary of the sample selection: 
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Table 3: Sample Selection Breakdown 
 
While it would have been ideal to include rejections, in addition to approvals, the FDA does not 
publish a consolidated database of rejected drugs. This is to avoid competitive and legal 
ramifications if the company decides to resubmit their application (Sarkar and de Jong, 2006). 
Some third-party databases exist that try and track drug rejections using company press releases, 
such as Pharma Intelligence’s Complete Response Letter database. Unfortunately, there is still a 
lack of information on the covariates of interest of rejected drugs to analyze their impact.2  
4.2 Data Collection of Variables 
Table 4 illustrates descriptive statistics of the numerical variables. Daily stock prices were 
generated from S&P Capital IQ using an Excel formula that references the ticker and FDA decision 
date. The daily Fama-French factors used to estimate benchmark returns were downloaded from 
Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS), with the NASDAQ Biotechnology Index (^NBI) 
                                                          
2 While covariate data does not exist for drugs that were rejected, they do exist for drugs that were rejected, but 
eventually approved. This corresponds with the drugs in the sample where previous_rejection = 1. Therefore, a 
potential way to include rejections in the sample is to include observations of these firms at the dates when they were 
previously rejected. Covariate data would remain unchanged and stock returns would be calculated based on the date 
of rejection (CRL) from the FDA. Unfortunately, several challenges emerged when trying to implement this approach. 
Firstly, 14 of 37 total drug rejections occurred before January 1, 2013, thus excluding them from the sample. Secondly, 
with only 23 observations remaining, there would not be enough degrees of freedom to run a fully-specified model to 
determine the impact of coefficients for rejections. As well, even in a pooled regression with the approvals, the small 
sample size of rejections limits the statistical power in interpreting effects. In addition, a pooled regression does not 
allow for differential coefficient effects for approvals and rejections. As such, the sample only includes approvals and 
the potential impact of endogeneity and bias are discussed in 4.4 Sample Selection Bias.  
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returns replacing the general market return. When estimating benchmark returns, since there are 
different drug observations of the same firm, the coefficients from the firm’s Fama-French model 
with the highest R-squared was used for all observations of that firm. For firms with an R-squared 
below 2%, coefficients were adjusted to the sample average, as the training period clearly did not 
reflect normal stock price behavior. Market capitalization and revenue data (used for the 
novice_firm variable) were retrieved in a similar way as prices from Capital IQ. Data for the price 
of the ^ NBI was gathered from Yahoo Finance. Index Match Excel formulas were used to calculate 
the ^NBI return for each observation and time interval, relative to its decision date.  
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics for Numerical Variables 
 
Table 5 illustrates descriptive statistics of the categorical variables. New drug application type was 
attached to the observations downloaded from the FDA approval database. No FDA disease type 
classifications exist for each drug, therefore the ailment that each drug treats was researched. 
Categories were chosen that aligned with the categories published by BIO so that disease type 
coefficient estimates could be compared to approval probability. Drugs were classified into disease 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max
HPR [-60,-1] 9.9% 29.5% -51.6% 136.3%
HPR [0,1] 4.9% 15.2% -29.5% 98.0%
HPR [2,20] 1.6% 16.8% -32.7% 72.6%
CAR [-60,-1] 1.1% 26.3% -49.3% 113.9%
CAR [0,1] 4.7% 14.6% -28.5% 86.3%
CAR [2,20] -2.0% 13.0% -33.3% 46.0%
HPR [-125,-61]  (previous_period 
return  for HPR [-60,-1]) 7.2% 30.4% -39.3% 168.8%
NBI [-60,-1] 4.1% 9.8% -25% 21%
NBI [0,1] 0.5% 2.3% -6% 11%
NBI [2,20] 2.3% 5.9% -15% 16%
mktcap  (millions) $19,600 $35,841 $86 $166,168
quarter 2.5 1.1 1.0 4.0
Dependent Variables
Independent Variables
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categories using personal judgement, with disease category guidance from Centerwatch’s Drug 
Information page (CenterWatch 2018) and GlaxoSmithKline’s Therapeutic Areas classifications 
(Huckman and Strick 2010). Rejection “complete response” letters (CRLs) (used for the 
previous_rejection variable) were found by first looking at each drug’s profile on the FDA Drugs 
Database. Most drugs have a “Review” page with a link to “Other Action Letters” that include 
previous CRLs. For drugs that do not have a “Review” page, the Letter of Approval was searched 
for “Complete Response”, as well as a search engine keyword search for “ ‘Drug Name’ Complete 
Response FDA”. Drugs were classified as Orphan and Expedited designation by comparing the 
drug names in the sample to those with these attributes listed in the FDA’s annual New Drug 
Therapy Approvals report.    
Table 5: Descriptive Statistics for Categorical Variables 
 
4.3 Holding Period Returns and Cumulative Abnormal Returns Observations 
From Table 4, the distribution of HPRs is extremely wide, especially leading up to the decision 
event. This is further motivation for looking at underlying characteristics that explain stock price 
movements, yielding more refined trading strategies. In addition to the HPR intervals in the table 
above, HPRs were looked at across all days in the event, relative to the stock being purchased at 
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Day -61. This was done to compare findings with those from De Schrijver and Rothenstein et al. 
This can be seen in Figure 1. 
Figure 1: Average Holding Period Return of Sample when Bought at t = -61  
 
A clear upward trend is evident leading to the decision event. This is followed by a further spike 
upon approval, as any uncertainty investors had is resolved at this point. Following approval, there 
is minimal fluctuation in stock price, indicating swift investor action. These patterns are consistent 
with findings from De Schrijver and Rothenstein et al., however the magnitude of HPRs are much 
smaller across each period. This may reflect different samples or a fundamental change in investor 
behavior around FDA events over time.  
CARs also exhibit a wide distribution. Interestingly, there is only a small abnormal return leading 
up to the event relative to the HPR. Once approval is received, the average HPR of 4.9% is almost 
solely attributable to abnormal returns, as was expected. Following approval, stock prices tend to 
underperform, possibly reflecting profit-taking activity or overenthusiasm. The distribution of the 
R-squared from each firm’s Fama-French normal returns model is shown below: 
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Figure 2: Distribution of Firm Stock Price R-Squared using Fama-French Model 
 
Again, there is high variance in how well a benchmark model is able to predict returns, highlighting 
the importance of both actual and abnormal return regressions. The average R-squared value of 
0.36 is almost identical to De Schrijver’s sample average of 0.35.  
4.4 Sample Selection Bias 
As it is only possible to include drugs that were eventually approved in the sample (non-random 
sampling), a potential source of endogeneity is sample selection bias. There may be unobserved 
factors that lead to different impacts for approvals and rejections. As such, it is important to 
discuss the likely direction of bias on the coefficients before discussing the regression results. In 
other words, how would the coefficients change if rejections were included in the sample.3 
During the pre-announcement period [-60,-1], investors are unable to distinguish between a drug 
that will be approved and a drug that will be rejected, due to all information being kept 
                                                          
3 These sample selection challenges would also be present in the aforementioned approach of trying to include 
rejections via drugs that were previously rejected, but ultimately approved. If this approach were implemented, 
implications would only apply to drugs that were rejected, but ultimately approved, as it is not a random sample. Since 
it is impossible to know if a drug will be rejected and ultimately approved at the time of the investment decision, this 
is further rationale for not pursuing this approach.  
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undisclosed by the FDA. This is reflected in the findings of De Schrijver (2013) and Rothenstein 
et al. (2011) who find no statistically significant difference in the returns of eventual approvals 
and rejections leading up to the decision. Therefore, there is likely minimal bias on the 
coefficients during the pre-announcement period and there is no clear rationale for whether any 
bias would be upwards or downwards. During the announcement period [0,1], there is a large 
divergence in the HPR and CAR of approvals and rejections (Table 1). If a dummy variable was 
used to represent drugs that were rejected, this variable would be negative and capture most of 
the negative returns. However, it is unlikely to pick up all of the effect, meaning that other 
independent variables would be lower (implying they are currently biased upwards). This most 
likely applies to variables that impact the probability of approval of the drug, including type of 
disease, type of new drug application, previous_rejection, expedited, and orphan. Since these 
variables impact an underlying probability of approval, a sample of only approvals (implying a 
probability of approval of 100%) overstates these effects. It is unlikely that firm-specific factors, 
such as log_mktcap, would be biased. During the post-announcement period [2,20], both 
approvals and rejections typically experience negative returns, with the magnitude for rejections 
slightly larger. Therefore, similar to the announcement period, variables that impact the 
probability of approval of the drug are likely biased upwards, however the magnitude of bias is 
likely lower than the announcement period. 
5.0 Results and Findings 
Table 6 shows the regression results of HPR and CAR returns on the independent variables of 
interest across each time-period. 
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Table 6: Effect of Firm and Drug Characteristics on FDA-Related Stock Price Returns 
 
5.1 Pre-Announcement Returns [-60,-1]: Models 1 and 4 
Broadly, a significant portion of a drug company’s returns prior to the FDA decision can be 
explained by returns in the ^NBI. A 1% increase in the ^NBI leads to an average increase in HPR 
of 1.42% at a 1% significance level, holding all other factors constant. This helps explain why the 
average HPR is 9.9%, while CAR is only 1.1%. Disease area classification is largely insignificant, 
with the exception of Psychiatry and Viral. Drugs in these categories have significantly higher 
abnormal returns, holding all other factors constant. This may be a result of greater market 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6
Time interval [-60,-1] [0,1] [2,20] [-60,-1] [0,1] [2,20]
bacterial -0.076 -0.050 -0.047 0.068 -0.051 -0.024
cancer 0.103 -0.042 -0.011 0.122 -0.045 -0.008
cardiovascular/ hematology -0.048 0.075 -0.013 -0.024 0.057 0.009
metabolic 0.008 -0.048 0.008 0.091 -0.053 -0.009
neurology 0.035 0.071 -0.071 0.083 0.052 -0.042
opthamology -0.010 -0.090* 0.083 0.025 -0.095* 0.080
psychiatry 0.128 -0.069 0.031 0.348* -0.056 0.081
viral 0.095 -0.038 0.017 0.175* -0.030 0.044
type1 -0.077 -0.075 0.102 -0.133 -0.051 0.063
type3 -0.153 -0.096* 0.069 -0.123 -0.081 0.062
type4 -0.250*** -0.121* 0.014 -0.210** -0.113* 0.002
type5 -0.187 -0.092 0.036 -0.160 -0.067 -0.001
BLA -0.123 -0.093** 0.076 -0.101 -0.068 0.049
previous_rejection 0.080 0.044 -0.112*** 0.062 0.043 -0.095**
expedited -0.046 0.040 -0.031 -0.030 0.030 -0.033
orphan 0.055 0.060 0.010 0.099 0.054 0.022
log_mktcap -0.011 -0.021* -0.006 -0.006 -0.022* -0.007
novice_firm 0.133 -0.036 0.011 0.130 -0.041 0.014
previous_period_return -0.001 0.006 0.023 - - -
NBI_return 1.421*** 0.519 1.463*** - - -
quarter -0.025 0.017 -0.030* -0.043* 0.015 -0.032**
constant 0.247 0.234** 0.080 0.157 0.240** 0.097
Observations 100 100 100 100 100 100
R-squared 0.372 0.228 0.425 0.216 0.197 0.231
F-statistic 3.69 1.56 4.74 1.58 1.24 2.54
***significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *significant at 10% level
Holding Period Returns (HPRs) Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs)
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potential in these areas. For example, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) [psychiatry 
disease] and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) [viral disease] global sales are expected to 
reach $25B (Persistence Market Research, 2016) and $22.5B (Global Data, 2017) in 2025, 
respectively. Importantly, the Psychiatry coefficient is likely biased by a psychiatry outlier with a 
CAR of 76%.  
Regarding application type, the coefficient on Type4 is significant at the 1% level and 5% level 
for HPR and CAR, respectively. Drugs of these types have the lowest returns, when comparing 
the coefficient magnitude to other types. This may be a result of investors ignoring or penalizing 
these approval opportunities, as they may not represent a significant impact on the profitability 
potential of the company. The difference in HPR coefficients of Type1 and Type4 are statistically 
significant at the 5% level, implying that, on average, Type 1 drugs have a 17.3% higher HPR than 
Type 4. Other type coefficient differences are not statistically significant.  
Other covariates are not statistically significant, but their sign is relevant. Companies of drugs that 
were previously rejected and have orphan drug designation have a positive impact on HPR, 
aligning with the higher approval likelihood of these drugs. Firms with no revenue also have a 
positive effect, while returns tend to decrease as market size increases. This aligns with the idea 
that stock price movements reflect the underlying profitability potential of the drug to the 
company’s drug portfolio.  
5.2 Announcement Returns [0,1]: Models 2 and 5 
The explanatory power of the HPR model drops significantly to an R-squared of 0.228, while the 
CAR model only drops slightly to 0.197. This implies that the effects of the ^NBI returns, SMB, 
and HML accounted for a larger portion of returns leading up to the event, but are less relevant 
22 
 
once news of the decision emerges. This is also seen as the coefficient on ^NBI for the HPR model 
is no longer significant. Disease types are again largely insignificant, with only ophthalmology 
significant at the 10% level. Despite a lack of significance, cardiovascular/hematology and 
neurology drugs may have higher announcement returns, given their positive coefficient.  
Application types become more significant during this period. Type3, Type4, and BLA are each 
statistically significant at the 10% level in the HPR model. Type1 continues to have the largest 
coefficient compared to other types, likely reflecting the material impact of these innovative drugs 
on the future of the company. Market size has a statistically significant effect at the 10% level, 
with every 1% increase decreasing announcement-period returns by 0.02%. Drugs that were 
previously rejected and have orphan designation continue to have a positive coefficient, while 
there is no longer a return premium for companies with no revenue.  
5.3 Post-Announcement Returns [2,20]: Models 3 and 6 
The impact of ^NBI_return returns to having a statistically significant impact on drug company 
returns at the 1% level. The magnitude of the coefficient is almost exactly the same as the pre-
announcement period, indicating a return to normal stock price behavior. Disease and application 
types are all statistically insignificant, implying that all price movements associated with these 
characteristics were captured leading up to and following the announcement.  
Interestingly, the impact of previous rejections is statistically significant at the 1% level and 5% 
level for HPR and CAR, respectively. However, the sign is negative, implying that, all other factors 
constant, a drug that was previously rejected experiences a 10-11% lower return following the 
announcement. This appears counterintuitive, given the higher probability of approval associated 
with previous rejections. This may indicate profit-taking activity of investors selling their shares 
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who had specifically bought the stock knowing that it had a higher probability of approval since it 
was previously rejected. Therefore, companies of drugs that were previously rejected may be 
overvalued at the date of the announcement.  
In addition, the coefficient on quarter is statistically significant at the 10% and 5% level for HPR 
and CAR, respectively. All other factors constant, each additional business quarter away from the 
first quarter (i.e. the decision event is closer to December) decreases post-announcement returns 
by 3%. These findings align with those of Sprague (2015) who found a statistically significant 
negative relationship between business quarter and the return of a company when it files a drug 
application patent. This may reflect a seasonality effect whereby investors are locking in profits 
from these high-risk stocks, particularly as they become more risk averse towards the end of the 
year and want to maintain a strong calendar year performance.   
5.4 Simplified Regression Results 
A challenge with the fully-specified model for each time-period is that there are only 78-80 degrees 
of freedom due to only 100 observations and 20-22 independent variables. The regression results 
of a simplified model that excludes all disease types, except ophthalmology and psychiatry, as well 
as previous_period_return can be found in Appendix 2. These disease types were excluded due to 
challenges in accurately classifying them into categories, while previous_period_return is 
excluded due to the lack of observed time-trend. Using this simplified model, the statistical 
significance of most of the variables that were initially significant improves. This is particularly 
true in the announcement period, as all application types are now statistically significant, except 
for BLA. Furthermore, in the pre-announcement period, orphan drugs now have a statistically 
significant return premium of 8.0% and 10.8% for HPR and CAR, respectively.  
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5.5 Implications for Short-Term FDA Trading Strategies 
The above findings were used to create general guidelines for investors interested in short-term 
FDA trading strategies. The first clear observation is that there is no significant upside to buying 
a company stock one day after it’s drug has been approved and selling 20 days later. The HPR is 
lower than the market return, contributing to an average CAR of -2.0% over the period.  
Instead, an investor should consider two options: 1) buying 61 days before and selling one day 
before the announcement, or 2) buying 61 days before and selling one day after the announcement. 
Option 2 presents the upside of an additional 4.92% HPR over these extra two days, if the drug is 
approved. Given that the observations in the sample set are conditional on the drug actually being 
approved, it is important to consider at what downside risk of rejection is it too risky to hold 
through the announcement being made. Using the approval probabilities from BIO (2015), the 
average approval rate in the sample is approximately 70%. At a 70% chance for a 4.92% return, 
the return from a rejection would have to be greater than –11.48% for the expected value of holding 
through the announcement to be positive:  
 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 [0,1]
=  𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑙 ∗ 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐻𝑃𝑅 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑙
+ 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ∗ 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐻𝑃𝑅 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
(18) 
 0 < 0.70 ∗ 4.92% + 0.30 ∗ 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐻𝑃𝑅 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛  
 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐻𝑃𝑅 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 >  −11.48%  
This value of -11.48% assumes risk neutrality and no opportunity cost. Therefore, given that most 
investors are risk averse and face the opportunity cost of being able to invest in other securities, 
the minimum average HPR of rejection to justify holding through the announcement is even 
higher. While the sample does not include rejections to calculate an average HPR of rejection, this 
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HPR of -11.48% can be compared to previous research. De Schrijver (2013) finds the average 
HPR of a NASDAQ rejection drops from 24.2% [-60,-1] to -3.6% [-60,-1], implying a HPR of 
approximately -27.8% from [0,1]. Rothenstein et al. (2011) find the HPR of a cancer drug rejection 
drops from 18.0% [-120,-1] to -30.0% [-120,1], implying a HPR of approximately -48.0% from 
[0,1]. While not a perfect comparison, these average HPRs of rejection are 2.4x and 4.2x less than 
the -11.48% calculated, implying that it is likely that the [0,1] average HPR of rejection is less 
than -11.48%. With an expected return from [0,1] below 0, it is not recommended that an investor 
holds a drug company beyond the day before the announcement.  
Therefore, an investor interested in capitalizing on potential FDA-related stock price returns 
should buy and sell at a period before the decision is made, such as from [-60,-1]. To achieve 
higher average returns, investors should select companies who embody characteristics with 
positive coefficients from Table 6. For example, companies should be selected of drugs whose 
application is Type 1 or a BLA, while avoiding Type 4 drugs. In addition, companies should be 
selected who do not have existing revenue and whose drugs have been previously rejected and 
have orphan designation. Psychiatry and viral drugs may also lead to higher returns. However, it 
is unlikely an investor will be able to consistently find companies who embody all characteristics, 
thus different HPR attribute combinations are analyzed in Table 7:  
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Table 7: Pre-Announcement HPR and Frequency (italics) of Attribute Combinations 
 
It is important that the recommended attributes occur frequently enough for it to be an actionable 
investor strategy. From Table 7, the three most frequent and highest return attributes recommended 
that investors screen for are type1, orphan, and novice_firm. Each of these observations occur in 
at least 19% of the sample and carry combination HPRs from 11% (i.e novice_firm and orphan) 
to 20% (i.e. type1 and orphan), all above the average [-60,-1] HPR of the sample.  
6.0 Conclusion 
In summary, this study analyzed the impact of drug, firm, and other attributes on the stock price 
movement of a company around an FDA drug approval decision. FDA approval is the final step 
required before a company can begin marketing and distributing their drug. While previous 
literature identifies patterns in stock price returns in the periods before, during, and after the FDA 
decision, this paper seeks to identify underlining characteristics that can lead to higher returns. 
This is done by observing the stock price returns and attributes of 100 drugs from January 2013 to 
December 2017 and whose company is listed on the NASDAQ. Regressions of both holding period 
returns (HPRs) and cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are conducted on these attributes.  
type1 BLA psychiatry viral previous_
rejection
orphan novice_firm
type1 13% - 40% 6% 6% 20% 16%
38 - 2 4 3 14 10
BLA - 10% - - - 7% -20%
- 10 - - - 5 1
psychiatry 40% - 14% - - 84% -
2 - 6 - - 1 -
viral 6% - - 5% - - -
4 - - 7 - - -
previous_rejection 6% - - - 15% 1% 52%
3 - - - 24 2 3
orphan 20% 10% 84% - 1% 16% 11%
14 10 1 - 2 24 4
novice_firm 16% -20% - - 52% 11% 19%
10 1 - - 3 4 19
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The bulk of pre-announcement returns can be attributed to returns of the market index (^NBI), as 
well as certain application types. While not statistically significant, the coefficients on drugs that 
were previously rejected, drugs of orphan designation, and drugs of firms who have not generated 
revenue are all positive, as expected. During the day of and after the FDA decision, almost all 
stock price movement is a direct result of the FDA outcome. Application type and market 
capitalization size are the main statistically significant drivers in this period. Finally, in the 20 days 
following the FDA announcement, stocks tend to underperform, possibly indicating investor 
overenthusiasm or profit-taking. The market return is again the most significant driver of stock 
price movements, while there is also a return penalty for drugs that have been previously rejected.  
Based on these findings, to maximize expected short-term returns, investors should only buy and 
hold the stock before the FDA decision is announced, with the recommended window of [-60,-1]. 
Investors should prioritize investing in companies that have not generated revenue and whose drug 
applications are Type 1 and have orphan designation.  
An interesting area of future research that is beyond the scope of this paper is the impact of 
biological markers (biomarkers) on stock price movements. A biomarker is a measurable indicator 
of the severity or presence of some disease state (BIO, 2015). BIO has found that the use of 
biomarkers as a criterion for enrolling patients into clinical trial studies increases drug approval 
from 83% to 94%. If investors can distinguish which drugs have used biomarkers, there may be 
higher returns associated to reflect the higher probability of approval. Additionally, this paper only 
looks at drugs approved during an economic upswing (i.e. bull market). Different returns and 
relationships may exist during a recession.  
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Appendix 1: Description of Variables (continued) 
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Appendix 2: Simplified Regression Results 
 
 
